# What's the Point of the Security of the European Union? Institutional Developments and Regional Strategies Reaching Military Autonomy

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**Abstract**
In the current context, many phenomena brought about by globalization affect the balance of the security policy of the European space and even of the global scene: economic and monetary crisis, regional conflicts, religious fanaticism, terrorism, organized crime etc. After a brief overview of developments in EU policy on security and defence, the author of this article presents new threats to European security, the current configuration of the relations between the EU, NATO, USA, the Russian Federation and China, possible options and responsibilities of both international organizations and states, in order to maintain international balance.

*Keywords*: defence, strategy, member state, power, alliance

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### Introduction

If the 20th century was the "century of extremes" (Hobsbawm, 1994), it seems that the 21st century will fit perfectly in the phrase of Eric Hobsbawm. Moreover, it seems that the unpredictable economic, monetary, seismic and climatic factors provide benchmarks that are to be improved by correct and predictable measures of decision makers. Regional conflicts, religious fanaticism, terrorism promoted in the name of faith, as well as violations of fundamental freedoms sketched the first decade of the third Millennium. Political developments relating to the national security and defence of the European Union (Avram and Bărbieru, 2009: 57) and NATO, reflected by the decisions of the summits of these organisms, also marked the beginning of the period in which Europe has become more stable, and relations with other international bodies have become essential for the stability of the area and today's security environment. A meaningful political process from the beginning of the Millennium is shaping by the alert territorial development of the European Union, which imposed a European Policy on Security and Defence, active and dynamic (Vicol, 2009: 16).

The history of the European Union reminds us that, since 1950, has been proposed by Churchill the creation of a United European army controlled by European democratic system and in full collaboration with the USA and Canada. In France, on October 24th the same year, has been released the plan for a European Defence Community (EDC) providing the creation of a European army consisted of units of the ECSC Member States. It was coordinated by a European Minister of Defence with common budget and under the control of the European Parliamentary Assembly. The Treaty by which the EDC was constituted was signed in Paris on 25 May 1952 by the ECSC Member States with additional protocols with NATO. The EDC Treaty, although ratified by five Member States, was rejected by the French National Assembly. It marked the beginning of the adaptation of the European Community to the internal problems of States, particularly to political issues, as well as to the international crisis marked by conflicts and strategic reassessment. After this point, the European process emphasized diversification. Pierre Hassner appreciate that European defence should not be considered as an "immediate response to urgent and precise military threat" but as a "test, renewed all the time, of the respective priorities of the Europeans, of their will for unity, of their will and their ability to reject external veto" (Avram, 2006: 171-172).

### What's the point of the common defence policy?

In the 70s of last century, Belgian politician Leo Tindemans shows that the EU would remain incomplete as long as there would not be a common defence policy. A number of causes, not entirely annihilated today, have been major impediments in the organization of a solid defence. The causes could be grouped according to their nature in: constitutional in nature (the creation of a European nuclear force was regarded as distant as the choice of a European federal Chairman); technological and legal difficulties due to the prohibition of transfers of military nuclear technology; diplomatic divisions; economic and psychological constraints, in particular for increasing annual military spending and persuading public opinion. The UN Charter, Security Council resolutions and the need for redefinition of the concept of the nation forced and still forces the perceptions of international law in general, and the definition of the European Union as a federated body with obligations in strengthening ties with the Member States, in particular.

The possibilities offered by nuclear guarantee of the treaties concluded between the former USSR and the United States, the possibility of installation of anti-missile shield

in Europe, economic and technological advantages of the USA, Great Britain, France and Germany against Russia, China, Iran and other countries with conflictual potential were sources of imbalance both during the cold war, and in the present existence marked by conflicts in the East of Ukraine, in Syria and Iraq, etc. (Frunzeti, 2013: 40-51; Tudor, 2014: 273). The threat posed by separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine to trigger this spring a new offensive to a territorial rapt as consistent as was Crimea for the sovereign State Ukraine, the actions of the Islamic State and of Al-Qaeda groups etc. have prompted the United States of America to develop new strategies concerning NATO duties. At the same time, due to terrorist acts, some of them foiled by security forces in the last period in continental countries like Spain, England, France, Belgium, the EU States are required to initiate new forms of strengthening the safety of both the States and their citizens. Among the proposed measures are the intent on a stationary tank and armoured divisions in Eastern Europe towards the end of the year 2015. It could be stationed in Romania, Poland or the Baltic States and constitutes, in the vision of Ben Hodges, Commander of the US Armed Forces in Europe, the argument by which the attacking pro-Russian and separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine could be halted. Another measure that Russia has annoyed is, of course, the missile shield.

### What's the point of the strategy for the Black Sea?

Deveselu and Kogălniceanu constitute important points in the NATO Defence plan in Romania, a border both of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. Romania's decision to strengthen the defence system and to modernize military equipment becomes possible due to the increase of the percentage of GDP allocated to the army. Participation of Romania's in the actions in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan have prompted the political factor in Romania, a country of the European Union, to reassess and, of course, to improve the defence potential of its citizens.

The strategy for the Black Sea, forming a new chance for Romania, disgruntled Russia, and, in the first phase, neighbouring Ukraine. The treaty with Ukraine, considered by the Romanian National Civic Forum "a big political mistake" (Frunzeti, 2013: 40-51; Tudor, 2014: 273), has limited Romania's territorial waters, giving the possibility of drawing up a strategy for exploiting oil and gas resources of the maritime platform. The problems of Moldova regarding Tiraspol enclave and this country's desire to join the EU constitute a flaw in the security politics of Romania, in our country's relations with Russia, reverted in recent years among the great powers of the world.

There is the need to complete the recent developments of the European security system architecture for the adoption of new strategies for the protection and safety of EU Member states and of states in North Atlantic Organization. The treaties on economic, cultural and social cooperation and collective self-defence and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the military field are just a few highlights of defence policy conceived in the years of the European construction.

The current European security architecture reflects the essential traits of the geopolitical environment in which it operates: the transition to a multipolar international system, the competition between powers in the Euro-Atlantic space for redistribution of roles; depth of integration into the EU; the Russian Federation's attempts to maintain the status of a great power on the world arena and to occupy key positions in the European security structures. Security is based on both political, but also military stability, these being complementary conditionings. A mobile system of European security will be raised only if both components will be consolidated. Security policy, based on cooperation

(specific for OSCE), rejects any idea of imposing stability by means of confrontation. The aim is to promote cooperation in order to prevent conflicts in policy and reducing the danger of armed confrontation. It also aims at avoiding the escalation of potential conflicts, putting special emphasis on the promotion of openness and transparency.

Defence and collective security, on the one hand, and security based on cooperation, on the other hand, are fundamentally different, but complementary tools, of international security policy. Application of the principle of subsidiarity in the European security supposes taking into consideration a system for multi-floor security: NATO, EU, OSCE and the UN. Engaging in one or more of these levels depends on the specifics of security tasks considered. The need for correlations, for optimisation in the co-operation between the various security institutions became more evident than ever. Developments in the EU, the competition between EU and NATO, the possibility that the national interests of some Western States prevail over the common ones, security assessment on the ideological and financial positions, the lack of a proper division of labour among participating States, are the main factors that influence the building of an efficient system of European security.

Institutional developments, recorded especially after modifying the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, gave a concrete form to the contribution of Europeans to the Euro-Atlantic security. The level of interoperability that is at the basis of EU-NATO relations give content to European collective capacity of crisis management.

A limitation of the sovereignty of EU Member States operates in the field of defence (Portelli, 1994: 160-162), initially resulting as consequence of the accession of European States to the Atlantic Alliance (1949), which put the European troops under the command of the United States. Immediately after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, on military level, operational structures and the general staff of the forces of the Western European Union (WEU), from Fontainebleau and Versailles, have been transferred to the Alliance, in 1951. In fact, the modified content of the Brussels Treaty confirms the option for crucial proximity to NATO: "in the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and organizations created by them in the framework of the Treaty will cooperate closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (Păun, 1999: 514). This transfer of sovereignty to NATO (still currently in force) has raised numerous obstacles to building a European defence policy because "it is difficult to transfer to Europe what already belongs to NATO" (Păun, 1999: 161). Because of this, security and defence issues were initially excluded from the cooperation domains.

Starting with the Single European Act (1986), Member States have declared themselves ready to coordinate positions on "political and economic aspects of security", but in the Treaty of Maastricht referred for the first time to the issue of security and defence, only in very vague terms, aiming at arriving at a compromise between the partisans of defence within the Atlantic Alliance and the partisans of a European identity of defence. Under the same Treaty, the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) (Dinan, 2000: 83) constitutes one of the pillars of the EU, together with European Community, internal affairs and justice. The Maastricht Treaty has established numerous ties between the EU and the WEU (Western European Union), raising the status of WEU at the status of "an integral part of the development of the EU", while maintaining its institutional autonomy, however. In 1991, the EU (through The Declaration of the WEU Member States that are also members of the EU, about the role of WEU and its relations with EU and NATO, Maastricht, 10 December 1991) declares itself "ready to develop close working relations between the WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role,

responsibilities and contribution of WEU Member States in the Alliance", which means a balancing of "burden sharing" (a division of the burden) between USA and Europe, desired by Americans for budgetary reasons and by Europeans for political reasons. Two main directions are identified in the first instance, considered by Europeans: removing dependency towards NATO in the military field and increasing EU responsibility by enhancing national forces interoperability; implementation of a programme of military drills and workouts together with NATO and eliminating any shortcomings in terms of communications and satellite observation.

The alliance has discovered that the technological gap between US armed forces and those of the European nations became increasingly larger. This fact is connected with the technological know-how and also with the fact that, after the Cold War, European nations have reduced military forces, knowing that there is no longer an immediate danger coming from the Soviet Union (Avram, Radu and Gaicu, 2006: 233). But the air campaign in Kosovo has outlined clearly in the minds of Europeans that, in addressing in a modern manner of crisis management and in ensuring a modern manners "of developing a campaign in such difficult areas, the Europeans have a big deficit before the Americans" (Klaus P. Klaiber, head of the "Political Problems" Division of NATO). The list of difficulties that have confronted the allies in Kosovo have convinced Europeans that they have to work very quickly in solving the problems of modern capabilities of crisis management: communications, fast air operations, aerial reconnaissance operations (Dufour, 2002: 195; Pond, 2003: 76-81).

### What's the point of establishing a joint reaction force?

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) has not included any explicit reference to the common defence policy, however after the Kosovo conflict has emerged the need for coagulation of a common European policy of security and defence (Avram, 2003: 161-162). At the Helsinki European Council (December 1999), Member States have decided to develop their military capabilities and to build new political and military structures for the purpose of investing the Union with an autonomous capacity to decide to launch and lead military operations under its direct management where and to the extent that NATO is not engaged, in the case of an outbreak of international crises (Dony, 2001: 283). It was noted, however, that this process does not involve the creation of an European army. The Lisbon Treaty, through Article 3ª, introduced the rule according to which "any jurisdiction which is not attributed to the Union by the treaties belongs to the Member States". Membership in the European Union should not affect the equality of the Member States with respect to treaties, as well as their national identities, inherent to their fundamental political and constitutional structures. The Union is bound by respect for local and regional autonomy of the Member States, the essential functions of the State and, in particular, those that have the purpose of ensuring its territorial integrity, maintaining law and public order and safeguarding national security. For these reasons, national security remains one of the areas of exclusive competence of each Member State in order that this matter will not be and is not intended to be regulated at European level because the EU could not manage this process better than the States themselves. The Lisbon Treaty provides that Member States can make available to Union civil and military resources for its operations in the field of the common security and defence. However, any Member State shall be entitled to oppose such operations because all its contributions can be made only on a voluntary basis. A group of Member States will be able to carry out disarmament operations, humanitarian and evacuation missions, missions of advice on issues of military

and peacekeeping operations. No Member State can be obliged to participate in such operations.

An important issue for both organizations, but also for the countries of Central Europe, remains the enlargement of the two organizations. It was desirable and it is desirable that the enlargement process to be compatible and to strengthen each other, due to the cumulative effect of security guarantees stipulated in Article 5 of the modified Brussels Treaty and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. For putting into force the Article 5 of the modified Brussels Treaty, all countries concerned have to be NATO members. When WEU still worked, the United States opposed to the admission of new countries in the WEU, with the status of full members, provided that they are not NATO members. Therefore, it is possible that EU enlargement will depend on the future on the one of the Alliance, in order to avoid, as it appreciates, obtaining security guarantees from NATO through "occult" means.

European decision establishing a joint rapid reaction force, with distinct, separate military planning bodies, deeply displeased Washington, which considers that, therefore, its dominant position in the Atlantic Alliance, determined by the massive financial contribution  including, will be greatly weakened. This dissatisfaction has found clear expression in the harsh judgments of the American Minister of defence, William Cohen: "there can be a separate group of EU interests in NATO", there must not be "parallel or redundant structures, because it will weaken the Alliance".

Expressing doubt that the EU could develop military autonomy, the prestigious political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski has released ten tips for American policy toward Europe: Europe must remain the natural and main ally of America; essential for achieving a sustainable balance in Eurasia is an Atlantic Europe; USA should not oppose to the creation of an autonomous European defence capability, even if it is unlikely to be realized in the near future; the political Union between the allies is more important than to strengthen NATO's capabilities; no decision must be taken about a missile shield until the consensus of NATO allies is obtained  on this issue; US need to support the expansion of the Alliance in Europe, but not beyond this area; the stakes of European enlargement are more important to US than those of the progress made in the direction of European unification; expansion of NATO and the EU must be made in concert; it must be taken in view the perspective of Turkey and Israel of joining both NATO and EU; no country should be ruled out a priori from the possibility of joining the North Atlantic Alliance and the EU (Lumea Magazin, 2000: 49).

In the field of European and Atlantic security took place two complementary processes, "separable, but not separate", regarding the use of forces and means: making the EISD (European Identity on Security and Defence) in NATO, outlined in the second half of the 1980s, and the FCSP (Foreign and Common Security Policy) within the EU (Banciu, 2006: 269; Avram, Radu and Gaicu, 2006: 223), a concept born in the European Council from Köln in 1999. The new strategic concept of the North Atlantic Alliance considers that developing a foreign and common security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, as provided for in the Amsterdam Treaty, is compatible with the common security and defence policy, established in the Treaty of Washington. Enhancing the security environment is directly proportional to the increase in responsibilities and capacities of European allies, with a focus on security and defence.

Security, as well as other areas of social, economic and political life, cannot avoid the effects of globalisation and the whole train of new technologies it brings with itself and which have radically changed the world of diplomacy and international relations.

# What's the Point of the Security of the European Union?

Globalization does not mean just free trade, associated with welfare population growth, the free movement of goods, capital and persons (with certain limits and restrictions laid down by law), but also terrorism, drugs and people trafficking, organized crime, the spread of disease, uncontrollable pollution. Of all these negative phenomena spread widely by the "wind" of globalisation, terrorism is the one who has contributed the most to the failure of the State to ensure the safety of its citizens. Dangers and threats associated with terrorism are in a continual evolution, external risks (proliferation and development of terrorist networks, spread of the phenomenon of transnational organised crime, enhancing international traffic of people or drugs, development of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear materials and technologies, unconventional lethal arms and means) conjugated with internal risks (issues related to national ethnic and religious minorities, setting up small terrorist cells, individual attacks or assaults, etc.).

Bearing in mind the indissoluble link between economic and military power of a State, the effects of economic problems are not neglected (for example, the global economic crisis triggered in 2008) that are amplified in conditions of globalization, due to increasing competition, spread of illegal trade, rising inflation and unemployment, etc.: "there is no economic power where there is no economic security nor economic security where there is no economic power" (Năstase, 2009: 88). In fact, one of the worst effects of the economic crisis that we still feel is that resulted in some reduction in military spending and a shift in priorities of national defence and military security of the main actors of the international scene. In order to minimize these effects, the researchers stressed that special "activities are necessary to help strengthen national security: 1. increasing national security generating resources; 2. Development, at regional level, of cooperative defence; 3. reducing economic, social, political, military and environmental vulnerabilities; 4. development of viable mechanisms for regulation and control; 5. increasing the efficiency of collective security systems; 6. enhancing economic cooperation, easing through joint efforts, the negative effects of globalization; 7. development of management and combating asymmetric threats; 8. increasing concerns for global security" (Tureac, Curteanu and Filip, 2009: 148).

In a multipolar world, "a world of states and alliances of states", it is worth considering, on the one hand, that the decisive role in the adoption of security decisions belongs to the UN Security Council, and, on the other hand, that the EU, US, Russian Federation and China have defined their spheres of interest (Frunzeti and Oprescu, 2013: 15). In the vast and intricate network of international relations, Europe remains a major ally of NATO and, therefore, of the United States, supporting the admittance of Turkey into the European Union and the strengthening of the European partnership with the Russian Federation, given its huge energy and commercial potential.

Tensions arising in EU-NATO relations are due to the difference arising between the strategic priorities of the two organizations: "on the one hand, an increasingly integrated Europe, concerned with its own security and stability and at most Mediterranean; on the other hand, a more global America, involved in Middle East and Asia and in the accomplishment of a policy of «international gendarme»" (Hotea, 2005: 122).

With strong trade relations, strengthened by Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in August 2012, the EU relied on its main partner only commercially but could not be ignored, however, Moscow's attempts to remove the Union off the American camp. Moscow's ambitious projects to create an Eurasian common marked and strengthen Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which covered

the sphere of influence targeted by Russian military doctrine, are in contradiction with the trends of expansion of the EU and the North Atlantic Organization to the East, with China's increasing power not only in Central Asia but also globally, with the rise of Japan and the "rebirth" of military, cultural and political Islam (Postevka, Zodian and Oprescu, 2013: 260-261).

A sticking point in European security remains Ukraine, even if its people support a third of its foreign trade with the EU trade partnership (Zodian and Oprescu, 2013: 164), has shifted political and military orientation shortly after the conflict in Georgia (2008), abandoning the policy of accession to NATO and of integration in the EU (Postevka, Zodian and Oprescu, 2013: 263).

An imbalance factor is the ethnic and inter-religious conflicts, the ones in the North and South Caucasus standing out in bloody episodes and serious violations of human rights, exacerbated by the political interference of the Russian Federation. While there will still be countries with poor governance, with ethnic, cultural or religious tensions, economically underdeveloped and with permeable borders, the UN, NATO, EU and other regional organizations will continue to be involved in managing internal conflicts as "strong Members wish to minimize their direct involvement, in particular by supporting one of the parties (especially by providing the necessary weapons)" (Badea, 2009: 75).

External interference, coupled with the inefficiency of states to ensure the security of their citizens will increase internal conflicts and international instability and security threat: "The internal conflict is the most lethal form of violence that erupted after the Cold War and produced more victims among civilians than inter-state wars and terror in one place" (Badea, 2009: 75).

American involvement in "orange revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine and Romania, Georgia and Ukraine's attempts to join NATO and the installation of US military bases in Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia, were hit by the vehement opposition of the Russian Federation, faced with the huge gap between its own military and economic potential and the one owned by the NATO-EU partnership (2,200 billion dollars GDP and 140 million inhabitants respectively 16,000 billion dollars GDP and 500 million inhabitants) (Postevka, Zodian and Oprescu, 2013: 262). These steps were taken by NATO to strengthen strategic positions in South-eastern Europe and the Black Sea. Recognizing the importance of strategic cooperation with Russia, NATO stresses, in the New Strategic Concept launched in 2010, that it does not see the Russian state as a provider of threats, but insists on "the need for reciprocity for building a truly equitable and sustainable partnership" (Cenuşă, 2010: 30). The Strategy Paper and the NATO-Russia Joint Declaration signed at the meeting in Lisbon on 20 November 2010, refers to the fact that both NATO and Russia "will develop relations with the respect of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states in the Euro-Atlantic area, reaffirming the importance of trust, transparency and mutual predictability" in the Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

### Conclusions

In a Post Cold War fictional scenario, which describes the possible effects that globalization may have on international security, "political tensions between the US and Europe will increase, transatlantic relations will deteriorate, the US will withdraw their troops from the old continent, while the European Union will withdraw into their own borders, while allocating significant resources to close neighbourhood stability by

engaging more actively Community institutions" (Badea, 2009: 78). Simultaneously, the crises in Latin America (Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Panama) will attract US attention on the region. Normalization of Korean relations and the possible *de facto* unification of the two countries in the peninsula could attract the support of China and Japan, while the US would decide to withdraw their forces from the region. At the same time, national rivalries between Asian powers would increase military preparations to resume weapons programs, including increased production of weapons of mass destruction. Given the inability of regional and global institutions to effectively manage conflict situations in the outskirts of Europe, Eurasia, Middle East, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, many countries would end up being marginalized, fact which will have major implications for state security, stability, democracy, human rights and prosperity. Obviously fictional, this scenario is dreamed, but "helps us to organize our ideas so do not be surprised by tangential reality and identify the most effective methods and tools for conflict prevention" (Badea, 2009: 78). Cooperation and collaboration between the various international organizations active in the field of security can provide resources and opportunities, but ultimately the responsibility for maintaining international balance and for it to be further supported – and the benefits of it benefit to all – belongs not only to international organizations, but also to all States, whether developed or developing, big powers or small states under the strong influence of the former.

The world today is not that of 25 years ago, even the few years ago, nor the last year, a month or a week. Radicalisation of options and pace of impoverishment are factors that determine the change, along with globalization, religious fundamentalism and the struggle to preserve national identity. The far right and far left shake hands, upsetting the European Union. Elections in Greece, attacks in France, pressures of far right in Britain, France and Germany, most of the far left in Spain and Italy, refusal, becoming more visible, to be accepted allogeneic form developed EU countries, closeness of Hungary to Russian Federation and expansionist tendencies manifested by Putin questioning the future of Europe, the peace and security of Romania.

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